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INTRODUCTION
Although interethnic conflict often grabs the headlines,' it generally
has gone unexplored in legal scholarship. In Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Califor-
nia at Davis. J.D., Harvard University; A.B., University of California at Berkeley. This
paper is based on a presentation at the roundtable discussion of "Critical Race Praxis-
Multiracial Coalitional Activism & Scholarship" at the 1998 Sixth Annual Western Law
Teachers of Color Conference in Oregon. Other speakers included Maggie Chon,
Ibrahim Gassama, Tom Joo, Rachel Moran, Gerald Torres (by videotape), and Eric
Yamamoto. I thank Maggie Chon for organizing the roundtable, inviting me to partici-
pate, commenting on a draft of this article, and arranging for the publication of this
symposium. The presentations of the other roundtable participants aided my thinking on
the subjects addressed here. Thanks to the University of Oregon School of Law for
sponsoring the conference and to Keith Aoki, Steve Bender, and Ibrahim Gassama for
organizing the event, which proved to be a supportive environment for scholars of color
to share ideas as well as build community. The UC Davis and Seattle University law
schools provided financial support for this research. Discussions with George A. Martinez
and Tom Joo helped me conceptualize ideas in this essay. Margaret Z. Johns offered
helpful comments on a draft of this paper. Deans Bruce A. Wolk and Rex R.
Perschbacher of UC Davis provided much-appreciated financial and moral support for
both this and my other work, scholarly and otherwise.
1. See generally Joel Millman, Going Nativist: How the Press Paints a False Picture of the
Effects of Immigration, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 60-64 (criticizing
sensationalistic articles suggesting that conflict and other social ills are attributable to im-
migration).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
and Political Lawyering Praxis in Post-Civil Rights America, Professor Eric
Yamamoto significantly contributes to the existing body of civil rights
literature by highlighting how such conflict demands our utmost atten-
tion.3 At various times in the United States, African Americans, Asian
Americans, Latino/as, Native Americans, and other minority groups have
suffered from conflict with each other as well as from their subordinated
status in American society. 4 The sensitive issues implicated make inter-
2. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Praxis
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997). Professor Yamamoto expands
on his theories regarding critical race praxis in ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE:
CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIvIL RIGHTS AMERICA 128-149 (1999).
3. Other commentators also have considered various aspects of conflict between
minority groups, although not as directly in the context of lawyering as Professor
Yamamoto does. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multira-
cial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 885-902 (1993) (noting that diversity of opinion among
various communities of color presents barriers in recognizing cultural pluralism); Deborah
Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 957, 973-74 (1995) (contending that "[t]raditional race-based classifications and
even generic 'minority' categories cannot withstand the pressures of escalating conflicts
within our increasingly multiracial minority population," and arguing instead for mul-
ticultural empowerment).
In scrutinizing conflict between racial groups, we should be cognizant of tensions
within groups that may arise in litigation and political action. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v.
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir.
1998) (addressing a discrimination claim by a Hopi Indian against a Navajo employer);
Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 197,
199-206 (1998) (analyzing conflict between the established Mexican American commu-
nity and immigrants from Mexico); Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 894-95 (recognizing how
litigation claiming discrimination against Asian American students by school district di-
vided an Asian American community); Lynda Gorov, A Divisive Echo of Vietnam:
Immigrants in a Free-Speech Standoff, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1999, at Al (reporting dis-
pute in California's Vietnamese community about whether Vietnamese shop owner could
display a poster of communist leader Ho Chi Minh and a communist flag). Although
minority groups may appear homogeneous to the outside observer, this is far from the
case. Internal schisms can prove as troublesome as conflicts between groups.
4. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE, THE ADVISORY BOARD'S REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY-FORGING A NEW FUTURE 33
(1998) (noting existence of controversy on President Clinton's race relations advisory
board between Angela Oh, a Korean American, and Dr. John Hope Franklin, a African
American, about whether the project should go beyond the "black-white paradigm");
Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean
American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles", 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993)
(analyzing Korean American and African American conflict in South Central Los Ange-
les); Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Violent
Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993) (discussing
the conflict between African American and Korean American communities in Los Ange-
les); Jack Miles, The Struggle for the Bottom Rung: Blacks vs. Browns, ATL. MONTHLY, Oct.
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ethnic conflict difficult to discuss, much less analyze. To ignore any racial
tensions, however, is to risk the eruption of unfortunate violence like that
seen in South Central Los Angeles in May 1992.' As a society, we must
address the underlying causes of such outbursts or be prepared to face the
consequences.
Professor Yamamoto asks that lawyers and scholars squarely confront• 6
the interracial divisions that plague our society. In order for such con-
frontation to take place, he contends that Critical Race Theory, with its
focus on racial subordination in American life must develop a link be
tween legal theory and practice. He proclaims the need for a "[c]ritical
race praxis" that "focuses pragmatically on what theories and concepts
provide workable approaches for understanding and diminishing oppres-
sive racial conditions." 9 This praxis should "combine[ ] critical pragmatic
1992, at 41, 51 (analyzing conflict between African Americans and Latin American immi-
grants).
5. See generally READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING (Robert
Gooding-Williams ed., 1993) (offering various perspectives on the causes of violence).
6. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 825-27.
7. Critical Race Theory (CRT) considers racial subordination to be a central or-
ganizing principle of U.S. society. See, e.g., KmberlI Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988). Critical Race theorists, among other things, critique the ability to
secure meaningful change in the racial status quo through law. See Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461, 462-63
(1993) (summarizing various CRT tenets, including critique of liberalism). For collections
of readings in this area, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995), and CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
8. As Professor Yamamoto states:
Race theorists, particularly legal race theorists, and political lawyers often
seem to operate in separate realms: the former in the realm of ideologies,
discursive strategies, and social constructions; the latter in the realm of
civil rights statutes, restrictive doctrinal court rulings, messy client man-
agement, discovery burdens, and politically conservative judges ....
Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 832 (footnote omitted); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing
Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1751 n.12 (1994) (book review) (observing that
"[c]ritical race scholars have lagged in their analysis of practice") (citations omitted).
9. Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 882; see also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory,
Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2161 (1992) (stating that Critical Race Theory's "theory-practice
approach, a praxis, ... finds a variety of emphases among those who follow it, and the
concepts are now rather open and still being explored") (footnote omitted); Raneta J.
Lawson, Critical Race Theory as Praxis: A View From Outside the Outside, 38 How. L.J. 353,
366-69 (1995) (calling for Critical Race Theory to develop practical applications for use
by minority communities and professionals).
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socio-legal analysis with political lawyering and community organizing
for justice practice by and for racialized communities."'0
Professor Yamamoto in effect advocates bridging the gap between
the theoretical and the practical in the law. Although he has progressive
ends in mind, this call has come from sources spanning the political spec-
trum, including the American Bar Association,' a prominent federal
judge, 12 and critical Latino/a, or LatCrit, theorists who focus on how law
contributes to the subordination of Latino/as and others in the United
States.13 Distinct from the general call for practical skills and much like
LatCrit theory, Professor Yamamoto's position has definite political ends.
In advocating a practical turn, he explores how attorneys might bring
about progressive social change through the courts while reducing con-
flict between minority groups. 4 His analysis implicates two major
questions addressed here: (1) What is the potential for bringing about so-
cial change through the legal system? and (2) What duties do attorneys
seeking social change owe to their clients?
At the outset, I must confess that my experiences as a lawyer and law
professor have indelibly informed my thinking on lawyering for social
change. Over the years, both before and after joining the legal academy, I
have represented immigrants in administrative and judicial proceedings.
Some cases involved individuals seeking asylum who feared political per-
secution if returned to their respective homelands; other cases dealt with
impact litigation" in which deeply committed attorneys represented
classes of asylum-seekers and other immigrants challenging the immigra-
tion laws and their enforcement. 6 As a law professor, I have studied the
10. Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 875 (footnote omitted).
11. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM (1992) (advocating increased skills training in law schools).
12. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (expressing concern about disjunction be-
tween legal education and profession).
13. See Laura M. Padilla, LatCrit Praxis to Heal Fractured Communities, 2 HARV. LA-
TINO L. REV. 375, 378 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Foreword: Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit
Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and Latinalo Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1,
53 (1997); see also Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Crossover Dreams: The Roots
of LatCrit Theory in Chicanalo Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143,
1144-50 (1999) (analyzing longtime activism of Chicano/a Studies scholars and relevance
to critical Latino/a theory). See generally THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) (collecting important LatCrit readings).
14. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 873-95.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 80-88 (defining and discussing impact litigation
as a tool for social change).
16. See, e.g., American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49-
52 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing on standing grounds a challenge to the lawfulness of recent
[VOL. 5:201
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intricacies of the immigration and civil rights laws, as well as the limits of
litigation in achieving meaningful social change.'7
This article analyzes two questions that are raised by Professor
Yamamoto's provocative article. Part I argues that any significant
transformation of the social structure of United States society is far more
likely to occur through mass political movements than through litigation.
Consequently, advocates of social change, especially those trained in law,
should not expect too much reform from the courtrooms. They instead
should consider how traditional legal action might complement and en-
courage-not replace-community activism and political involvement.
Put simply, an exclusive focus on litigation will not accomplish fully the
desired objective.
Part II contends that attorneys' ethical duties to their clients limit
lawyers' ability to shape the world in the ways they see fit. The con-
straints increase considerably after the attorney agrees to represent the
client. At that point, she must zealously pursue the case in a way that
furthers the client's best interests. The attorney primarily must represent
the client, although she does have control over how to conduct that rep-
resentation and may be able to shape the client's case in important ways.
changes to immigration laws that expedite the removal of asylum applicants from the
United States); affid, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 254 (D.C. Cir, Jan. 11, 2000); 2000 U.S.
Barapind v. Rogers, No. 96-55541, 1997 WL 267881, at *6 (9th Cir. May 15, 1997)
(reversing denial of asylum claim by Sikh applicant from India); Ceballos-Castillo v. INS,
904 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of claim of Guatemalan asylum appli-
cants based on adverse credibility finding); Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS,
795 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 807 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1987)
(challenging the lawfulness of Immigration & Naturalization Service policy of detaining
and transferring asylum applicants to remote locations where it was virtually impossible
for them to secure legal representation); Brief for Amid Curiae Law Faculty and Instruc-
tors in Support of Respondent, INS v. Elramly, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996) (No. 95-939)
(seeking certiorari in case involving deportation of noncitizen convicted of certain crimes);
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Immigration Lawyers Association in Support of Re-
spondent, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342) (arguing that
deference to agency's denial of asylum to Guatemalan teenager was unwarranted); Brief
for Amici Curiae Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United States
House of Representatives in Support of Respondent, INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314
(1992) (No. 90-925) (contending that Attorney General could not permissibly consider
foreign policy in denying asylum claim of former Provisional Irish Republican Army
member).
17. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as
"Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REv. 347, 362-67
(1997) (questioning whether law is the best method for bringing about changing the
status of people of color in the United States); Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immi-
gration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42,
45-56 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration] (expressing concern over
the viability of law as an instrument for improving the Latino/a condition).
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Combining these two points, I contend that the potential for social
change through litigation is limited, and that the discretion of attorneys to
promote change through traditional legal remedies is similarly con-
strained. Consequently, visionaries advocating social change must look
well beyond these limited horizons."
My contentions directly relate to Professor Yamamoto's call for a
"critical race praxis" with a focus on litigation. In light of the limited
ability of litigation to secure change, one must question the ability of a
litigation-oriented praxis to achieve such change. Moreover, the attor-
ney's professional responsibilities to clients, specifically to zealously
represent one's clients within the bounds of the law, limit his or her
power to proceed independently on a path seeking true social transfor-
mation. This too affects Professor Yamamoto's endorsement of praxis.
Given these constraints, the rare litigation implicating interracial conflict
should not be surprising (given the lawyer's duty to clients whatever the
conflict) or troubling (given the limits inherent to litigation).
I. LITIGATION VERSUS POLITICS IN TYING THEORY TO PRACTICE
Social reformers long have pondered the best means to achieve
meaningful and lasting social change. Litigation often has been heavily
relied upon as a means to that end. 9 History reveals, however, that the
most penetrating changes in society have occurred when litigation com-
plemented a mass political movement, such as the civil rights struggle of
the 1950s and 1960s.2°
Focusing primarily on the impact of lawsuits seeking redress from
the courts,1 Professor Yamamoto considers the place of lawyers in secur-
ing social change through litigation. Some critical theorists, however,
forcefully contend that litigation alone cannot achieve meaningful
change.22 Many critics argue instead that political organizing, not legal
18. To some readers, these points might appear rather obvious. Nonetheless, legal
scholarship in this realm tends to ignore these truisms. Efforts to improve our society
certainly deserve scholarly inquiry. At the same time, we must be realistic about the
promise of litigation and lawyers to secure change.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 80--88.
20. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994) (documenting the efforts by
Justice Thurgood Marshall to secure civil rights through litigation as part of the larger civil
rights movement).
21. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 830-39 (analyzing "disjuncture" between Critical
Race Theory and legal practice).
22. See generally RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SO-
CIAL REFORM AND LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994) (examining barriers limiting the
[VOL. 5:201
Lawyering for Social Change
remedies, should be the centerpiece of any transformative agenda.23 In
their view, mass mobilization has vastly greater chances of changing the
status quo than attempts at using the courts to enforce the conservative
rule of law.24 In Gerald Rosenberg's words:
Normative and constitutional concerns about whether
courts ought to be used to further social reform are mis-
placed if the conditions under which they can do so are so
rare as to make the production of that change unlikely. Of
greater concern are the implications of seeking significant
social reform through the courts for political participation,
mobilization, and reform. Social reformers, with limited re-
sources, forgo other options when they elect to litigate. Those
options are mainly political and involve mobilizing citizens to
participate more effectively.25
imaginations of lawmakers and society with regard to bringing about social change);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 1-8 (1991) (examining limited ability of courts to implement change);
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORI-
TIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 5 (1993) (arguing that, "for structural reasons, the
institutional role that the [United States Supreme] Court is destined to play ... is the role
of assuring the continued subordination of racial minority interests").
This principle has also been ably documented in Mexican American civil rights
litigation. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-
American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555, 557-60 (1994)
[hereinafter Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy]; see also MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A.
(1992) (documenting abusive practices directed at home service workers despite many
legal protections); Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre de Dios Todo-Poderoso: The
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Narrativos Legales, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 45, 72-75
(1998) (reviewing the dispossession of Chicano/as from the lands through legal means
despite the legal guarantees of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); George A. Martinez,
The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
321, 326-27 (1997) (analyzing how Mexican immigrants who successfully established in
courts that they were "white" for purposes of naturalization were still denied the societal
benefits of "whiteness"). Further discussion of the Court's role in focusing public atten-
tion and affecting social change can be found in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed., 1998).
23. See, e.g.,JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! at vii (1972) (documenting the organization of
"ordinary working people" to strike and revolt against industry); FRANCES Fox PIVEN &
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY
FAIL (1977) (analyzing critically the history and success of political movements); cf.
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1278 (1993) (articulating how the Supreme Court has offered little protection to poor
persons by engaging in toothless review of laws disadvantaging them).
24. See supra note 22 (citing authorities).
25. ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 343 (emphasis added); see also Richard L. Abel,
Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 LAW & POL'Y 5, 9 (1985) ("[Ljegal means of resolving
FALL 1999]
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It is far easier, intellectually and otherwise, for legal scholars and
lawyers to focus on intricate litigation strategies. Trained in law, lawyers
and law professors almost reflexively look to the law for solutions. How-
ever, the total effect of these strategies on the change equation, even if
successful, ultimately may prove marginal.
Consider the interaction in recent years between litigation and po-
litical action with respect to affirmative action. A successful political
response to Hopwood v. Texas,26 the highly publicized court of appeals
decision invalidating the University of Texas Law School's affirmative
action admissions plan under the Constitution, shows how political action
may trump litigation. After much political wrangling in the wake of the
court's decision in Hopwood, the Texas legislature passed a law making the
top ten percent of students from every high school in the state eligible for
admission to the University of Texas, thereby ensuring the eligibility of
students at predominantly minority high schools. 27 This swift political re-
problems should be avoided whenever possible, for they tend to reinforce the client's
experience of powerlessness."); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefon-
tein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699, 742 ("Litigation may falsely raise in
the community the expectation that appeal to 'the law' can somehow give it power.
Thus, the community may put its energy into litigation instead of the much more difficult
work of organizing itself.") (citation omitted). Consistent with the observation that litiga-
tion has its limits, evidence suggests that some poverty lawyers have moved away from
the adversary process in efforts to help their clients. See Ann Southworth, Business Plan-
ningfor the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitators in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 1996 Wis. L.
REv. 1121, 1169 (reaching this conclusion based on empirical research).
In addition, litigation in certain circumstances will prove of marginal utility with-
out changing the law. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 343, 344 (1994)
(showing discrimination against Latino/as caused by employer sanctions program created
by immigration laws); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus:
The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493,
1502-06 (1998) (analyzing how conventional wisdom about European immigrants'
smooth assimilation into society has influenced development of immigration laws and
modem immigration debate).
26. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). For an analysis of
Hopwood in light of Supreme Court precedent, see Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Crite-
ria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U.
CoLo. L. Rv. 1065, 1105-11 (1997).
27. According to the Texas statute:
Each general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for
admission... if the applicant... is applying for admission from a public
or private high school... with a grade point average in the top 10 per-
cent of the student's high school graduating class.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (West 1998). The circumstances culminating in the
passage of this law are discussed in David Montejano, On Hopwood: The Continuing
Challenge, in REFLEXIONES 1997: NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES 133
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sponse to the judicial prohibition of affirmative action holds the promise
of a more diverse student body at the University of Texas than existed in
the heyday of affirmative action.28 Importantly, it highlights the critical
distinction between politically- and litigation- oriented means of social
change.
Of course, litigation may prove, and historically has proven, to be a
valuable tool for successful social movements. 29 This is true even though
litigation is far from the exclusive-or optimal-means for securing social
change. Rather, one could envision a successful change program em-
ploying a mix of political strategies and traditional legal strategies, with
the proper allocation of resources devoted to each open to debate. 0
Distinguishing between litigation and political strategies becomes
vitally important in any attempt to make critical theory more practical.
Political mobilization is a tricky business beyond the pale of many,
perhaps most, lawyers and legal scholars. Depending on diverse historical,
social, cultural, economic, and political factors, some activism succeeds
while some fails. For example, although a political response prevailed in
(Neil Foley ed., 1998); see also The American Bar Association Showcase Program-The Geog-
raphy of Race in Elections: Color-Blindness and Redistricting, 14 J.L. & POL. 109, 118-20
(1998) (comments of Professor Gerald Torres describing political dynamics culminating in
this response to Hopwood); David Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas' Ten Percent
Solution: Improving Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181 (1998) (analyzing
the possible benefits in the improvement of elementary and secondary education due to
the Texas law).
The Texas rule, however, has come under attack from students at predominantly
white high schools not in the top 10% of their class who claim that less qualified appli-
cants are being admitted into the University of Texas over them. See Patrick Healy,
Admissions Law Changes the Equations for Students and Colleges in Texas, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., May 3, 1998, at A29.
28. See William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and Diversity After Hopwood, 10
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 185 (1999) (offering early results of Texas' plan and stating that it
ultimately may lead to steps that would increase diversity at the University of Texas). But
see Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 245, 246 (1999) (discussing genesis of Texas law and its limited impact to this point
in time in increasing minority enrollment).
29. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 342-43 (noting assistance offered to social
movements by litigation); Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration, supra note 17, at 55-56
(articulating the need for Latino/as to employ a mix of political and legal strategies to
achieve social change).
30. See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FoR AL. 85-114 (1989). This is not to
suggest that changes to the laws brought about by political action instantly result in social
reform, which is far from true. See, e.g., Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accom-
plishing Racial Change: School Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REV. 677,
743-44 (1997) (analyzing limited impact of school desegregation statutes in securing inte-
grated schools).
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Texas in the wake of Hopwood,3' California and Washington saw political
forces eliminate affirmative action and other race-conscious remedial pro-
grams through a racially-divisive initiative process in which the courts
declined to intervene." Political efforts to enact a watered-down version
of the Texas plan met substantial resistance in California before it ulti-
mately was adopted 3
Given the limits of litigation to achieve change, critical theory fo-
cused on litigation rather than political action, as envisioned by Professor
Yamamoto, can only hope for incremental change at the margins. Con-
sider the Immigration Law Clinic at the University of California at
Davis,34 part of a national network of eminent immigrant rights advocates.
This clinic represents many clients, including ones with difficult cases in
which the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) seeks to remove
them as noncitizens with criminal convictions from the country. Students
31. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
32. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir.)
(upholding Proposition 209, California initiative barring the state from considering race
and gender in state programs), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997); Steven A. Holmes, Victo-
rious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at A25
(reporting that Washington voters passed Initiative 200, which eliminated racial prefer-
ences); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187, 194-95 (1997)
(analyzing the lawfulness of Proposition 209). The end of affirmative action at the Uni-
versity of California came at a time when African Americans and Latino/as students and
faculty were seriously underrepresented as compared to the general population. See
Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA LJ. 607, 616-18
(1998).
One benefit of the recent attacks on affirmative action is that colleges and univer-
sities are beginning to seriously reconsider admissions criteria. See Susan Sturm & Lam
Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv.
953, 956 (1996) (advocating innovative reevaluation of admissions standards). See generally
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF TIE RIvER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIvERsIrY ADMISSIONS (1998) (studying the
benefits of affirmative action); CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MAR J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T
Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) (offering arguments in favor
of affirmative action).
33. See Emily Bazar, Senators Seek Major UC Admissions Reforms, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Feb. 11, 1999, at A4 (discussing opposition in California legislature to proposal that four
percent of graduating students from each high school in the state be eligible for admission,
combined with demand for sweeping reforms to improve access to the University of
California). Despite the resistance, the Board of Regents of the University of California
ultimately approved the four percent plan. See Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Regents OK Plan to
Admit Top 4%, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A18.
34. See Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda P&ez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C.
Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory Into Practice and Practice Into Theory, 51 SMU
L. REv. 1423, 1459 (1998) (analyzing work of this clinic and relationship of clinical legal
education to critical theory). Although I serve as an informal advisor to the clinic, I do
not hold a formal position in it.
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in the Immigration Law Clinic have made a difference in the lives of
many clients by successfully resisting the removal of, among many others,
a disabled Mexican immigrant, a Mexican asylum applicant fleeing Chia-
pas, a Laotian woman convicted of a crime, and countless Central
American asylum applicants.35 Moreover, by energizing the student body
and spawning interest in immigrant and refugee rights in the community,
the clinic has helped raise the consciousness of the local and greater
community regarding the United States government's treatment of immi-
grants. Through presentations and community workshops, as well as
efforts to publicize the plight of immigrants, the clinic has combined
community education with effective client representation. Clinic alums
now work for immigrants and disenfranchised communities with organi-
zations such as California Rural Legal Assistance, Legal Services of
Northern California, and AYUDA ("Help" in Spanish), an organization
providing much-needed assistance to immigrant women.
36
Far from unique, the Immigration Law Clinic is one of many pro-
grams across the country with attorneys and students working long hours
with little fanfare for a good cause. 37 Nonetheless, the nativist beat surged
in the 1990s and, due to strong political pressures,3 Congress responded
with radically restrictive immigration legislation and heightened deporta-
tion efforts.39 Consequently, immigration clinics, as well as many
35. See id. at 1440-45. The clinic has also done important impact work, including a
recent amicus curiae brief involving a Guatemalan asylum applicant in the Supreme Court.
See Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondent, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S.
Ct. 1439 (1999) (No. 97-1754) (filed on behalf of numerous immigration and human
rights organizations).
36. SeeJohnson & P&rez, supra note 34, at 1451-52.
37. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L.
Riv. 1461, 1495-98 (1998) (describing work of International Human Rights Clinic at St.
Mary's University School of Law); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and
Critical Race Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 741, 762-65 (1997) (discussing the Tribal Law
Clinic created at the University of Arizona that allows students an opportunity to serve
indigenous peoples); see also Johnson & Perez, supra note 34, at 1427 n.18 (listing many
law school immigration clinics).
38. For a flavor of the political concerns contributing to the passage of the laws as
articulated by one of the leading congressional proponents of restrictive immigration re-
forms, see Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right
Reasons, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 883-92 (1997).
39. See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 143 (1998)
(characterizing 1996 reforms to immigration laws as "the most radical reform of immigra-
tion law in decades-,-or perhaps ever"); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act,
the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833 (1997) (analyzing the impact of
1996 immigration reforms); see, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, % 423, 440-42, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272, 1276-80 [hereinafter AEDPA]
(eliminating judicial review of many removal decisions); Illegal Immigration Reform and
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organizations that provide free or low-fee legal advice to noncitizens,
now face a vastly increased caseload as more noncitizens require help in
the face of accelerating INS deportation efforts.40 Onerous new legal re-
quirements also make successful representation more difficult. 4' The UC
Davis Immigration Law Clinic, for example, found it increasingly difficult
to represent its clients as some cases became virtually impossible to win,
while others increased substantially in the necessary time commitment.
Ultimately, one would have to conclude that litigation-related successes• 42
have produced limited benefits to the greater immigrant community.
Politics quickly achieved retrograde change in the face of litigation suc-
cesses and, in the larger scheme of things, litigation offered little
resistance.
43
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (IIRIRA)
(limiting judicial review of removal decisions, restricting relief from removal, and amending
immigration laws in other ways); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, % 401-51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261-76 (making
many immigrants ineligible for certain federal public benefit programs). See generally IMMI-
GRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (presenting a collection of essays documenting the resur-
gence of nativism in the United States).
40. See Mirita Ojito, Change in Laws Sets Off Big Wave of Deportations, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1998, at Al.
41. See Johnson & P&ez, supra note 34, at 1454-55.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25. Similarly, if too successful, clinics may
suffer political attacks. For example, because of the success of the Tulane Environmental
Law Clinic in litigating against toxic polluters, the Louisiana Supreme Court enacted
restrictions that effectively barred clinical representation in such cases. See Terry Carter,
One Chief Justice's Political Gumbo, A.B.A. J. Dec. 1998 at 26, 26.); 4here Business Meets
Justice: Louisiana's Legal Clinics, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 30-33.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 19-33. However, successful litigation softened
some of the harshness of the 1996 changes to the immigration laws. See, e.g., Henderson
v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that habeas corpus review of
certain removal orders survived new immigration laws), cert. denied sub nom., Reno v.
Navas, 119 S. Ct. 1141 (1999); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1998)
(same), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999). But see Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338,
1356 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that habeas review is not available), vacated and remanded,
119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999); Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195-96 (7th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1027 (1997). The current situation facing immigrants is reminiscent of a
century ago, when despite litigation victories and political mobilization, the Chinese
American community could not halt the punitive federal, state, and local measures di-
rected at them. See generally CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH FOR EQUALITY: THE
CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1994)
(documenting the history of legal and social discrimination directed at Chinese and Chi-
nese Americans in the United States).
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One initially might conclude that immigration law and policy is
exceptional because noncitizens have precious few rights 4 and cannot
participate in the political process.4' However, such exceptionalism is
far from self-evident. Legal services, prison, and civil rights organiza-
tions across the country face remarkably similar problems. Congress, for
example, has shackled federally-funded legal service groups serving
poor and working people through drastic budget cuts; strict limitations
on political and lobbying activities; elimination of potential attorney fee
recovery in successful litigation; bars on class actions, and thus impact
litigation; preventing participation in abortion, prison, and welfare liti-
gation; and prohibitions on the representation of noncitizens in
immigration matters.46 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act has limited habeas corpus review of death penalty cases.47 Similarly,
Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act48 in 1996 with the
intent of eliminating the changes secured by past litigation and discour-
aging future civil rights lawsuits by prisoners.' 9
44. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (emphasizing the legislature's
power to exclude noncitizens with very limited judicial oversight); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 69 (1976) (holding that Congress could restrict public benefits to legal immi-
grants). The so-called "plenary power doctrine" effectively precludes judicial review of
Congress's substantive immigration law decisions. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANG-
ERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the
Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996).
45. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. Rav. 1139, 1139
(analyzing political vulnerability of noncitizens).
46. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing
to enjoin many of the Congressional restrictions on Legal Service Corporation (LSC)
funding); Legal Aid Soc'y of Hawaii v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017, 1021-22 (9th
Cir.) (upholding various Congressional restrictions imposed in 1996 in the face of First
Amendment and other challenges), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998). See generally J.
Dwight Yoder, Note, Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the Constitutionality of Con-
gressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 827 (1998)
(compiling restrictions imposed on LSC funding and outlining constitutional challenges to
them).
47. See AEDPA, supra note 39; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2550 (1998) (discussing how habeas corpus
provisions of AEDPA, along with other new laws, "sought to limit not merely federal as
distinguished from state court authority, but judicial authority generally. ) (footnote
omitted).
48. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 801-10, 110
Stat. 1321, 1321-66-1321-77 (1996) (PLRA) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626,
28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, 42 U.S.C. § 1997).
49. Various provisions of the AEDPA and PLRA have been the subject of criticism.
See Deborah Decker, Comment, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-Management, 1997 Wis. L. REV.
1275, 1276 (analyzing the constitutional issues raised by the PLRA's limitation of consent
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Not ignoring this dynamic, Professor Yamamoto observes that the
critique of traditional civil rights law reform efforts "leave[s] unaddressed
the ways in which political lawyering can meet contemporary demands of
frontline antisubordination practice." ' This, however, leaves open the
question of what precisely "political lawyering" is. Matters are compli-
cated by the fact that the most pessimistic of the critics downplay the
changes that can be achieved through law and, by implication, through
any sort of "lawyenng."" It is therefore unclear why there should be a
significant focus on lawyering of any kind, political or otherwise.
This is not simply an esoteric, semantic quibble. Political lawyering
could mean bringing lawsuits as part of a comprehensive impact strategy.52
Alternatively, it could involve politicization of a trial to obtain publicity
for a case or cause.13 Still again, political lawyering might mean that a
lawyer would focus her efforts on political activities, such as community
organizing or lobbying the legislature5 4 At bottom, the concept of politi-
decrees); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE
L.J. 1, 74 (1997) (arguing that laws either will have no effect or will have unintended
detrimental results); Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the
Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 389, 407 (1998) ("The
purposes of the PLRA were to end what was thought to be overly intrusive intervention
by the federal judiciary in the management of prisons and to curb what was described as
frivolous inmate litigation.") (footnote omitted). Among other changes, the PLRA lim-
ited prospective remedies in actions in which prison inmates may prevail and took steps to
reduce prisoner access to the courts. See PLRA, supra note 48, §5 802-803 (limiting re-
covery and attorneys' fees).
The limits of litigation, and its potential trumping by the political process, also are
demonstrated by developments in other areas of the law. A non-civil rights example of
successful litigation provoking a political response is the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, which imposed increased pleading
and other requirements on securities fraud actions to deter the filing of such suits. See
generally Symposium, F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: The Impli-
cations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 447 (1998)
(analyzing various restrictions imposed on private securities fraud litigation by new law).
50. Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 836 (footnote omitted).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 80-88 (discussing advantages and limits of
pursuing impact litigation).
53. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 NYU REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 379-89 (1982-83)
(offering examples of attorneys politicizing trials to influence public consciousness); see also
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 289-91 (1976) (highlighting the political nature of William Kunstler's lawyering
in famous "Chicago Eight" trial).
54. See generally MARY S. PARDO, MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN ACTIVISTS: IDENTITY
AND RESISTANCE IN Two Los ANGELES COMMUNITIES (1998) (analyzing successful com-
munity activism by Mexican American women in Los Angeles); RICHARD STEVEN
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cal lawyering needs additional investigation. Put differently, in the politi-
cal realm, what's a lawyer to do?
Of all the tools for change, political action holds the most transforma-
tive potential. The political response to Hopwood5 and the anti-affirmative
action initiatives in California and Washington are clear examples. Simi-
larly, recent imnmigration and welfare "reform," 6 criminal law, 7 and
legislation in other areas 8 demonstrate the promise of political activism. In
the grand scheme of things, litigation has a marginal impact. This cold truth
naturally restricts the impact that attorneys may have in promoting social
change. Lawyers serious about social change therefore should see how liti-
gation strategies fit into the community's political activities.
It is important to appreciate these limits on attorneys, even those
committed visionaries with deep creativity and shining brilliance. Such
constraints ultimately limit the potential of attorneys to achieve mean-
ingful civil rights improvements for subordinated peoples through
litigation.
II. THE DUTIES OF LAWYERS TO CLIENTS AS
A CONSTRAINT ON SOCIAL CHANGE
Professor Yamamoto focuses on litigation as part of critical race
praxis. To illustrate his point, he discusses interracial conflict arising in Ho
v. San Francisco Unified School District59 and United Minorities Against
STREET, ORGANIZING FOR OUR LIVES: NEW VOICES FROM RURAL COMMUNITIES (1992)
(discussing various organizing strategies employed by California Rural Legal Assistance);
Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environ-
mental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992) (analyzing the need for community
organizing to attack environmental racism).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28, 31-33.
56. See supra note 39 (citing laws).
57. See, e.g., AEDPA, supra note 39; PLRA, supra note 48; Recent Legislation,
Criminal Procedure-Sentencing--California Enacts Enhancements for Prior Felony
Convictions-Act of March 7, 1994, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch.12 (A.B.971) (to be
codified at Cal. Penal Code § 667) 107 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2123 & n.1 (1994) (noting
that California has joined a growing number of states adopting "Three Strikes" laws re-
quiring life sentences for three time felony offenders); see also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick
J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 767-69 (1995) (studying political pressures
on judges in death penalty cases and advocating reform).
58. See supra text accompanying note 46.
59. 147 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 1998); see Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 821-27; see also
Selena Dong, Note, "Too Many Asians": The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination Against
Asian Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1995) (offering
background of, and analyzing various difficulties posed by, this litigation); Ramirez, supra
note 3, at 971-72 (discussing interracial conflict caused by this case). The Ho case is often
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Discrimination v. City and County of San Francisco. In Ho, a class of Chi-
nese schoolchildren alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of race
under a consent decree entered in a school desegregation case brought by
African Americans and Latinos.61 In United Minorities, African Americans
and Latino/as sued the City and County of San Francisco for allegedly
discriminating against them in hiring and promotion in favor of Chinese
Americans. 62 These cases at some level pitted minority groups against
other minority groups. Perhaps more importantly, they raised the specter
of creating law that undermines affirmative action and civil rights protec-
tions for all people of color in the guise of providing legal redress to
minority plaintiffs.63
Professor Yamamoto aptly describes the difficulties facing the attor-
neys in Ho and United Minorities. Three rough conceptions of the lawyer
for social change help us to better appreciate the problems facing attor-
neys seeking to resolve interracial conflict or, for that matter, any social
problem, in the midst of litigation. Fortunately, such schisms between
minority groups, though arising occasionally, do not seem to be typical of
civil rights cases.64
referred to as the "Lowell High School case" because the plaintiffs claimed that they were
denied admission to this "public magnet school in San Francisco, [which] enjoys a repu-
tation for academic excellence and produces illustrious graduates." Id. at 971.
On the eve of trial, the parties in the Ho case settled and agreed to eliminate racial
quotas and banned the practice of requesting racial or ethnic identification on admission
forms. See Mary Curtius, California and the West Schools Drop Race Factor in Admissions
Education: Lawsuit Settlement Avoids Divisive Trial Mhile Leaving Some Elements of Desegrega-
tion System Intact, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A3 (stating that "[a]ll parties said the
settlement prevented a potentially divisive trial that would have brought racial tensions to
the surface .... ).
60. Third Amended Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief,
United Minorities Against Discrimination v. City and County of San Francisco, No. C-
91-2350 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 9, 1994) cited in Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 855-57,
n.162.
61. See Ho, 147 F.3d at 856-57. The consent decree provided that no single group
could constitute more than 40% of the student body. See San Francisco NAACP v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 576 F. Supp. 34, 53 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
62. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 855-57 & n.162 (listing the allegations).
63. See Dong, supra note 59, at 1045-56 (discussing how the Lowell High School
litigation threatened to create generally negative affirmative action law).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 103-109.
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A. Conceptions of the Social Change Attorney and the Atorney's
Professional Responsibilities to Clients
The lawyer's role in our adversarial system greatly impacts her ability
to ease interracial tensions caused by litigation strategies. Consider three
perspectives on the role of the public interest lawyer.
1. The Zealous Advocate
The lawyer as a "zealous advocate" embodies the traditional con-
ception of the lawyer in our adversary system. Founded in the rules of
professional responsibility governing attorney conduct, the model gener-
ally requires attorneys to zealously represent their clients within the
bounds of the law. 6' This duty is not without its limits. 6 The zealous ad-
vocate ideal, however, represents the traditional conception of the• 67
attorney and her primary loyalty to the client.
The zealous advocate model reflects a client-centered view of pro-
fessional responsibility, which some criticize for failing to consider the
65. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 5, para. 2 (1996) ("As ad-
vocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system."). The Model Rules further state that:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of
a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.
Id. at 6, para. 7 (emphasis added); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-19 (1986) ("The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are
the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.") (citation omit-
ted); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 951, 958-64 (1991)
(discussing parameters of the duty of zealous advocacy and its evolution in the rules of
professional responsibility). For analysis of the tension between this duty and the obliga-
tions imposed on attorneys as officers of the court, see Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as
Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 90-91 (1989); Robert W. Gordon, The Inde-
pendence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1988); Lanctot, supra, at 965-67.
66. See generally Symposium, Litigating Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law, 87 Ky.
LJ. 903 (1998-99) (reviewing duty of zealous advocacy from number of vantage points);
Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 671 (1997) (analyzing limits on duty of zealous advocacy).
67. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS 8 (1998) (stating that the "Dominant View" of a lawyer's ethical duties are en-
capsulated by the "mandate of 'zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law'....")
(quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1969), and MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983)). This view "legitimate[s] the lawyer pursuing any arguably
lawful goal of the client through any arguably lawful means." SIMON, supra, at 8.
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attorney's multiple roles. Commentators emphasize the need to consider
other values in the representation of clients, such as the morality of the
client's position 69 and the need to promote racial harmony.
70
This model at times flounders in its application to public interest law
because of ambiguities in the identity of "the client ' 71 who the attorney
must zealously represent. For example, in a class action-a means of law
reform frequently utilized by civil rights groups72-is the "client" the class
representative (which is how the representative might view it), the class as
a whole (as the law sees it),7 3 or some greater community value or set of
68. See Margaret Chon, Multidimensional Lawyering and Professional Responsibility, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137, 1138-39 (1992) (analyzing multidimensional responsibilities of
attorney to clients, courts, and society); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside
of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 994-99 (1997) (analyzing inade-
quacies of zealous advocacy concept in litigation involving group rights).
69. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083 (1988) (contending that, in civil practice, the attorney's "basic consideration should
be whether assisting the client would further justice"); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the
Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1981, 2023-24 (1993) (arguing that "[ljaw schools should promote the
ability of their graduates to effectively counsel their clients on moral issues").
70. See Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to
Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1995).
71. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 699-700
(7th ed. 1997); F. RAYMOND MARKS ET AL., THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 224-38 (1972); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-
Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 709, 732-63 (1989); see also Stephen
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in
Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1111-28 (1992)
(analyzing conflicts between group participation and individual autonomy in public inter-
est litigation); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of
Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1440-42 (1996)
(noting how Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Professional Responsibility
fail to answer questions about class counsel's duty to class); Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining,
Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1993) ("Despite the prominence
of the class action mechanism as a form of representation, there is very little guidance on
how class action lawyers should understand the nature of their duty to represent the
members of a class."); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw.
U. L. REV. 469, 481-82 (1994) (observing that current ethical rules "assume[] a Lin-
colnesque lawyer strongly bonded to an individual client[,]" which is not the case in mass
tort class actions).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(c) (defining requirements for bringing class action). See
generally Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 682-93 (1979) (responding to criti-
cisms of Rule 23 and class actions generally, including many still made over twenty years
after the article's publication).
73. See Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The courts have
recognized that the duty owed by class counsel is to the entire class and is not dependent
on the special desires of the named plaintiffs.").
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values (as the attorney often considers it)?74 In a classic article, Professor
Derrick Bell explores the difficulties posed to the attorney facing con-
flicting demands of class members in a school desegregation case . He asks,
"how should the term 'client' be defined in school desegregation cases that
are litigated for decades, determine critically important constitutional rights
for thousands of minority children, and usually involve major restructuring
of a public school system?, 76 The answer to this fundamental, deeply per-
plexing question greatly affects the nature of the zealous advocacy pursued
by the attorney. The lack of clarity about "the client" allows an attorney
representing a class greater discretion to pursue her own aims than is ordi-
narily tolerated .
Zealous advocacy can be seen in the lawyering in United Minorities,
in which plaintiffs' attorneys alleged discrimination claims on behalf of
Latino/a and African American clients but failed to identify in the com-
plaint and briefs either the individuals who allegedly had discriminated or
74. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 341-57 (1988). This problem has
vexed class action attorneys and judges in many different types of cases. See Parker, 667
F.2d at 1214 (affirming approval of class action settlement despite objection of ten of
eleven class representatives and emphasizing that class attorney represents class as a whole
rather than class representatives individually); Jean Wegman Bums, Decorative Figureheads:
Eliminating Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 202 (1990)
(advocating elimination of class representative requirement as not serving any useful pur-
pose to litigation and as class attorney is not bound to follow the representative's
instructions); Matthews, supra note 71, at 1436 (analyzing class action attorney's duties to
children in structural reform litigation); Morawetz, supra note 71, at 59 (analyzing diffi-
culties of class conflicts in evaluating settlement of class action); cf. Michael J. Glennon,
Who's the Client? Legislative Lawyering Through the Rear- View Mirror, 61 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 21, 21-22 (1998) (stating difficulties with determining who the "client" was of
legal counsel to Congressional committee). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIE-
VAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 238-66 (1987) (analyzing how
social concerns with racial discrimination, consumer protection, and environment interacted
with procedural nles in modem class action litigation); William B. Rubenstein, Divided We
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns,
106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997) (studying difficulties in reconciling disputes among clients and
attorneys in public interest litigation).
75. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976); see also Ellmann, supra note
71, at 1111-28 (analyzing difficulties facing attorneys who represent groups); Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. PEv. 1183, 1186-91 (1982) (offering a
variety of types of intraclass conflicts in impact litigation).
76. Bell, supra note 75, at 471.
77. See Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 394 (1987) ("[Tihe lawyer [in a class action] exercises un-
paralleled control because not all potential class beneficiaries are present or watching; thus,
it is not necessary or realistic in class suits to obtain authorization to make many decisions,
which in ordinary two-party litigation are made only after client consultation.") (footnote
omitted).
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the alleged, mostly Chinese American, beneficiaries of the discrimina-
78
tion. The failure can be explained by the fact that the plaintiffs' aim of
proving unlawful discrimination was hindered by the race of the alleged
discriminators and beneficiaries. As Professor Yamamoto suggests, the fact
that the alleged perpetrators and beneficiaries were minorities greatly
complicates the discrimination allegations from a legal perspective and
might well undermine the equities supporting the plaintiffs' claim.79
Consequently, their zealous advocates omitted these facts in order to tell
the story in the way most favorable to the plaintiffs' case.
2. The Impact Lawyer
The second conception of the lawyer focuses on attorneys who
pursue impact litigation, called "movement" lawyers by some. These at-
torneys want to win cases to establish good precedent for future cases. 8°
Careful in selecting their cases, they pursue only those actions likely to
advance the law in the direction they want it to go. 8' The carefully or-
78. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 857-59. Various filings in the case make it clear
that the primary beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination and many of the decisionmak-
ers who allegedly discriminated were Chinese American. See id. at 856.
79. See id. at 857.
80. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994) (recounting the story of
civil rights litigation from the perspective of movement lawyers); ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS
ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1983) (relating biography of "people's
lawyer" who focused on impact litigation); see also John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context:
The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927 (1999) (examining professional responsibilities associated with
cause lawyering on behalf of inner city poor). See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (1976) (articulating changing
nature of litigation toward broad social reform cases, often involving government, rather
than litigation between private parties); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (analyzing "structural reform"
litigation); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 444-45 (1982)
(expressing concerns with power of judges to "manage" modem litigation, especially
impact litigation). For an examination of the professional responsibilities of attorneys in
impact cases, see CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
81. A succinct history of law reform efforts by advocacy groups in the United States
can be found in Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976). See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978)
(analyzing general efforts at social change through law).
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chestrated desegregation strategy culminating in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion82 is a much-heralded example of successful impact litigation.
Like the zealous advocate conception, the impact lawyering model
raises questions about the identity of "the client." It also implicates a
deeper conceptual problem. The civil rights attorney often decides first
on the desired "impact" 9 f a piece of litigation and then selects clients.
Many impact lawsuits arise from instances in which the attorneys identi-
fies the legal problem, which affects many people adversely, and then
searches for "good" clients to represent the class8 3 This does not seem all
that uncommon or problematic, at least assuming that the attorney is truly
committed to vindicating the interests of the class representatives and the
class as a whole.84 Importantly, the class representative's interest generally
coincides with the attorney's impact goals.85 For example, in a challenge
to a reduction in public benefits, both the client and the attorney want to
maintain the level of benefits. Exact congruity of interests is not necessar-
ily the case, however. A class representative may be more interested in
personal relief (benefits to himself or herself) than in benefits to the class
of similarly situated persons.8 6
Moreover, because impact litigation is attorney-diven, it "may do
little in the long run to empower the disempowered. Impact litigation in
particular often treats class members as little more than passive observers,
pawns of well-meaning attorneys pursuing social change." 87 In essence,
82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE His-
TORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975) (providing an overview of the events and strategy surrounding this
seminal school desegregation decision); TUSHNET, supra note 20 (analyzing history of legal
strategy of lawyers seeking civil rights for African Americans of which Brown was a critical
part).
83. See, e.g., American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
254 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2000) (dismissing on standing grounds challenge to lawfulness of
recent changes to immigration laws expediting removal of asylum applicants from the
country); Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.
1986), amended by 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1987) (challenging the lawfulness of an INS
policy of detaining and transferring asylum applicants to remote locations where it was
virtually impossible for them to secure legal representation).
84. See Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and
the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REv. 646, 661 (1994) ("Clearly, the majority of class ac-
tion litigation is initiated by attorneys.").
85. This observation comports with my experiences as a lawyer in impact litigation.
See supra note 83 (citing cases).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77 (discussing and citing sources analyzing
the difficulties faced by class action attorneys).
87. Johnson, supra note 45, at 1226 (footnotes omitted); see also Lucie E. White, Mo-
bilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. R.Ev.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 544-45 (1987-88) (arguing that welfare litigators often put the
lawyer's agenda for reform before the client's interest); Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My
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attorneys may use the "clients" as tools to achieve their larger impact de-
sires. This creates theoretical, ethical, and practical problems. Specifically,
what limits are there on attorneys and what stops them from using the
courts for their own personal, as opposed to the client's or society's, ends?
Ultimately, the class action attorney or impact lawyer possesses great
power over the direction of a lawsuit. Though theoretically bound to
further the interests of the class, the attorney as a practical matter has
much leeway in determining what is in the best interests of the class. This
discretion-like all discretion-may be used to achieve good or bad ends,
although it seems difficult to identify many cases of abuse in the civil
88rights context.
3. The Critical Lawyer
Concern with client disempowerment due to the impact litigation
strategy spurred creation of the "critical lawyering" model, in which the
empowerment of clients is at the forefront. The critical lawyering con-
ception of the lawyer emerges in important legal scholarship by, among
others, Gerald L6pez, Anthony Alfieri, and Lucie White, which focuses
on how lawyers may empower clients through law so that they might be
able to fend for themselves in a world without lawyers.89 "Critical law-
Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 443 (1996)
(exploring distinction between activist lawyer's goals and client's legal needs). There are,
of course, other disadvantages to impact litigation, including the high costs of litigating
class actions. See Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 197, 238 (1997) ("The costs of litigating
class actions are so enormous that few firms can afford to handle the litigation at all, and
each firm can only litigate a few cases simultaneously.").
88. Some might claim, however, that suits brought by conservative organizations,
such as the Pacific Legal Foundation, seeking to vindicate the property rights of citizens in
the face of environmental and zoning regulations, or other groups seeking to dismantle
affirmative action, in fact constitute abuse of impact litigation in the name of civil rights.
See generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS
AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996) (documenting how
well-funded conservative foundations have, among other things, funded impact litigation
to pursue conservative ends).
89. See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 74 (1992) ("When the aim to educate itself becomes a core
of any acceptable notion of providing sound help, familiar practices like interviewing,
counseling, planning, negotiating and litigating take on a different look and feel.");
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,
100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2145-46 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice]
(explaining the need for poverty lawyers to educate their clients regarding the law,
thereby empowering clients to defend themselves); White, supra note 87, at 544-45
(calling on attorneys to educate their clients). Some literature also analyzes how race and
racial identity factor into the lawyer's professional obligations. See, e.g., Anthony V.
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yering aims to provide subordinated people with greater access to legal
representation and to promote more social change." 9 Critical lawyers
collaborate with clients who, through lessons learned in the litigation
process, may in the future act on their own behalves in other spheres,
such as community organizing and politics. Reformers by nature, critical
lawyers differ from traditional impact litigators in their methods which
focus on collaboration with clients to empower them, rather than lawyer-
driven litigation goals. Although sharing a similar perspective with other
critical theorists about the need for social change, critical lawyers firmly
believe that lawyers and lawyering can make a difference, a proposition
that some critical theorists reject. 9'
Professor Yamamoto presumably would laud the critical lawyering
movement, which strives to link theory and practice and move critical
thinking beyond futility.9 2 The open question, however, remains whether
critical lawyering will achieve its ambitious aims. Specifically, does this ver-
sion of lawyering in fact have the potential to assist in bringing about social
transformation? In addition, it ultimately is unclear just how substantially
the "critical lawyer" differs from the liberal attorney seeking incremental
improvements for disenfranchised communities. Both seek change
through law, although the importance of the client to the attorney's rep-
resentation may differ.
B. Application to Ho and United Minorities
The three conceptions of lawyering outlined here are not mutually
exclusive. It is possible in certain instances to satisfy the client's legal• • • 93
needs, reform the law, and empower clients in one litigation. That,
however, is not necessarily the case. Tensions between these goals be-
come clear in cases like Ho and United Minorities, which trouble Professor
Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1293, 1293 (1998) (studying the effects "of race,
lawyers, and ethics in American law"); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recog-
nition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1502 (1998) (discussing the
conflicting pressures felt by Black lawyers and attempting to articulate a method allowing
these pressures to co-exist in harmony).
90. Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REy. 415, 416 (1996) (foomote omitted).
91. See supra note 22 (citing authorities criticizing liberal conception of change).
92. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 873-75 (beginning analysis of "critical race
praxis" with discussion of critical lawyering literature).
93. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 89, at 2146 (describing
strategy that empowered a client, secured her food stamps, and reformed a food stamp
program).
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Yamamoto because of the interracial conflict that they might generate.94
But what is the role of the lawyer and the role of the law in the litigation
process? Is the lawyer representing the plaintiffs in Ho and United Minori-
ties supposed to be concerned primarily with winning the case, with the
potential impact of the case on the evolution of the law, or with empow-
ering clients? Or, as Professor Yamamoto suggests, 9' should the attorney
strive to minimize interracial tension, perhaps even abandoning the case if
that would best accomplish this end?96 Put most bluntly, what's a lawyer
representing the plaintiffs in these cases to do?
Light can be shed on the problem of the attorney's role in easing
interracial conflict by viewing it from the three conceptions of the attor-
ney sketched previously. Under the zealous advocate model, the attorney
must do whatever is necessary, within the bounds of the law, to increase
the chances that her clients will prevail. Once the attorney has accepted
the case, she has pledged-indeed has a professional obligation-to take
positions to ensure lawful treatment of Chinese American schoolchildren
(Ho) and to halt unlawful discrimination against African Americans and
Latino/as in employment (United Minorities).97 Focused on the sacrosanct
duty to clients, the zealous advocate would have relatively little concern
about the possible ripple effects of the case's outcomes on the relations
between minority groups.
An impact attorney focused on the outcome of litigation as it fits
into a larger change strategy presumably would decide before accepting the
case whether the action, if successful, would likely have the desired im-
pact. Once the attorney selects the desired impact, the case, and the
"client," she zealously would represent the plaintiffs' cause while being
careful not to take positions that ultimately might undermine the desired
result. This may well have been the tactic of the attorneys representing
the plaintiffs in Ho and United Minorities. Indeed, in Ho, a law professor
served as counsel for the California State Board of Education, which
sided with the plaintiffs on appeal. 98 This professor may well have hoped
94. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 855-66.
95. See id. at 889-95.
96. See id. at 837-39 (noting interracial justice claims that go unaddressed in cases and
suggesting need for attorneys, scholars, and activists to pay attention to such concerns).
97. Professor Bill Hing, who advocates that attorneys have the professional responsi-
bility to advise their clients before filing legal actions about solutions that diminish, as
opposed to exacerbate, interracial tensions, seemingly would agree that the lawyer's duties
change once the client has selected a remedy. See Hing, supra note 70, at 922-23.
98. See Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1998)
(listing Professor John C. Yoo from University of California at Berkeley School of Law
(Boalt Hall), as counsel for California Board of Education).
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to convince the court to adopt reasoning that would undercut the legal
underpinnings for race-conscious admissions programs.99
Traditional civil rights impact attorneys, however, would be less
likely to take cases like Ho and United Minorities. Civil rights organizations
make difficult judgments about which lawsuits to pursue on a daily basis,
and must decline representation of clients with potentially meritorious
cases because of the possible negative impact on the development of civil
rights law.'00 Although an unfortunate result for potential clients who may
be unable or may find it difficult to secure representation, such outcomes
are necessary for civil rights groups marshaling limited resources in the
hope of moving the law in a certain direction.
A critical lawyer, of course, wants to win, but would consider other
impacts of the litigation, especially the impact on client empowerment.
Informed by Professor Yamamoto's concerns, the critical attorney would
seek to collaborate with the plaintiffs in Ho and United Minorities and at-
tempt to constructively address and ameliorate interracial conflict,
possibly even trying to build multiracial coalitions to achieve change."°
This strategy raises a number of important questions: What is empower-
ment in these circumstances? Does it matter whether the power sought
allows for, or even requires, diminution of the power of other subordi-
nated groups? Could it result in in-fighting among groups of minorities
rather than combating the more general evil of discrimination against
.people of color? These difficult questions lack ready answers.
Even with these conceptions of the attorney in mind, I am not sure
what we realistically can expect of attorneys representing plaintiffs in cases
like Ho and United Minorities. Attorneys have duties to clients and should,
99. Cf. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. PEv. 1121, 1123-24 (1996) (questioning inher-
ent remedial powers of federal courts to ameliorate discrimination through imposing
structural remedies on state institutions).
100. See Susan P. Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: Organizational Structure and Correc-
tions Advocacy, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 9 (1993) (stating that the impact litigation
"model emphasizes the importance of selecting cases based on their potential impact on
the law and their likely ripple effect on institutions not before the courts") (footnote
omitted); see, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1054-55 (1970) (describing the moral difficulties facing poverty lawyers in turning away
clients).
101. See George A. Martinez, African Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race:
Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 213, 214 (1998) (calling "for
an epistemic coalition comprised of all minority groups so that each group achieves
knowledge about themselves and their place in the world"); Francisco Valdes, Foreword:
Under Construction-LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
1094 (1997) (stating that LatCrit theory "seeks to expand and connect anti-subordination
struggles, [and therefore] the LatCrit exercise thus far has been a collective design ...
always rooted in the ideal of community and the aspiration of coalition").
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and do, take care in choosing them. The acceptance of representation
narrows an attorney's options substantially. In these cases, the attorneys
agreed to represent the plaintiffs and pursue their discrimination claims. It
may well be too much to ask an attorney after accepting a case to consider
all the possible conflicting interests. This, however, is precisely what
Professor Yamamoto seems to advocate.
0 2
Ultimately, in analyzing the practical turn of critical theory, we need
to determine what role law and lawyers are to play. Only after we make
this determination, we will have a better idea about the duty lawyers have
in these types of cases.
C. How Prevalent is Interracial Conflict in Civil Riglsts Litigation?
The extended discussion of Ho and United Minorities might suggest
that civil rights litigation frequently generates interracial conflict. It is not
clear, however, that it arises all that often. 10 3 Indeed, the long history of
minority coalitions in school desegregation litigation suggests that any
recent rifts may not be representative. In a major Mexican American
school desegregation case that served as a precursor to Brown v. Board of
Education,'°4 Thurgood Marshall filed an amicus curiae brief for the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People supporting the
legal challenges, as did the Japanese American Citizens League.0 5 More
recently, minority activist organizations have been united in important
affirmative action litigation, such as Bakke and Hopwood.
' °6
102. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 884-89 (analyzing social meaning of justice sys-
tem and contending that various actors in system should consider messages sent to society
by litigation).
103. But f. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration, supra note 17, at 57-63 (discussing
division within civil rights coalition on immigration law and policy); Rachel F. Moran,
Getting a Foot in the Door: The Hispanic Push for Equal Educational Opportunity in Denver, 2
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Summer 1992, at 35 (analyzing conflict between Latino/a and
African American interests in school desegregation litigation in Denver); Ramirez, supra
note 3, at 969-74 (outlining conflicts between minority groups in voting rights, school
desegregation, and employment cases).
104. See Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947).
(holding that a class of persons of Mexican ancestry were denied their Equal Protection
rights because they were forced to attend segregated schools).
105. See Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 22, at 577-79 (analyzing the impor-
tance of Mendez to the Brown litigation); see also Constance Baker Motley, The Historical
Setting of Brown and Its Impact on the Supreme Court's Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9,
13-14 (1992) (articulating how part of litigation strategy culminating in Brown v. Board of
Educ. was "inspired" by Mendez).
106. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (amicus curiae
briefs filed by a variety of African American, Latino/a, and Asian American organiza-
tions); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (recording that Mexican
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Although interracial conflict unquestionably occurs in certain in-
stances, we must take great care to ensure that it does not divert attention
from larger social justice concerns. As Professor Charles Lawrence articu-
lates:
The ideology and culture of white supremacy turn commu-
nities of color against one another by creating hierarchies of
privilege and access and by assigning racially subordinated
groups to different places within those hierarchies. Those of
us who are assigned a higher status on this ladder find that
our belief in another group's inferiority gives us an invest-
ment in white privilege. 0 7
The divide-and-conquer strategy in which minorities are pitted
against minorities historically has been employed to fragment and isolate
minority communities. Consequently, coalitions challenging the status
quo are inherently unstable. This occurs, however, more in the political
arena than in the litigation trenches, as seen in the public debate over
such divisive issues as affirmative action and immigration.
As Professor Yamamoto fears, litigation in certain circumstances may
exacerbate interracial conflict. 0 8 That should not be surprising because
litigation is, in fact, institutionalized conflict. Although we must be vigi-
lant in trying to minimize interracial strife to the greatest extent
possible, 0 9 it remains to be proven that it is a major problem in modem
civil rights litigation.
CONCLUSION
Professor Yamamoto's call for "critical race praxis" is more than
necessary. If truly dedicated to social transformation, critical theorists
must create a practical constructive alternative to the racial status quo in
American Legal Defense and Education Fund filed amicus curiae brief supporting the posi-
tion of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund).
107. Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of
Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 831 (1995) (footnote omitted); see Johnson, Civil
Rights and Immigration, supra note 17, at 57-63 (contending that focus on conflict between
minority groups deflects attention from larger social problems of poverty, racism, and the
like in the United States); Angela E. Oh, Race Relations in Los Angeles: "Divide and Con-
quer" is Alive and Flourishing, 66 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1647, 1650 (1993) (highlighting the
portrayal of the conflicts between African Americans and Korean Americans during the
Los Angeles riots).
108. See Yamamoto, supra note 2, at 821-27; see also supra note 103 (citing authori-
ties).
109. See Hing, supra note 70.
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the United States. Efforts to connect the intellectual discourse with the
community is central to such efforts.
At the same time, Professor Yamamoto's advocacy of community-
based lawyering must confront the barriers to bringing about change
through litigation. First, there are constraints on the extent to which the
law can be utilized to secure meaningful social change. Consequently, the
role of the attorney seeking social change through the law is an extremely
difficult one. As a practical matter, law is not politics, though it is inher-
ently political. The litigator's tools for change-enforcing the rule of
law-are far narrower than the politician's tools-creating or changing
the law. This difference affects the ability of litigation to secure change.
Second, the professional obligations imposed on attorneys by the le-
gal profession limit the ability of attorneys to serve as freewheeling agents
of social change. Under the rules of professional responsibility, attorneys
have duties to "clients" in social change litigation that inhibit their ability
to pursue their own agenda, no matter how laudable the aims. As Pro-
fessor Yamamoto discusses, attorneys in civil rights litigation occasionally
face problems with interracial conflict. Generally speaking, lawyers' pro-
fessional obligations require that such conflicts must be considered and
evaluated by the attorney before agreeing to represent the client. Fortu-
nately, civil rights litigation generally does not appear to spawn significant
interracial conflict with regularity.
Ultimately, Professor Yamamoto has raised important questions that
should gives us all pause to think. Perplexing issues about the role of the
attorney seeking social change promise to remain with us well into the
next millennium. Calls for better focus on the methods for achieving so-
cial transformation always will be on the horizon. The tying of theory
and practice in legal scholarship, as well as the general meaning and pur-
pose of scholarship,1 ° will remain with us as well. Professor Yamamoto
has blazed a trail that we must follow, or hazard the consequences.
110. See Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship,
80 CAL. L. Rv. 889 (1992) (attempting to elaborate theory for evaluating legal scholar-
ship).
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